Tuesday, November 26, 2013

WalMart: Monopsony Destabilizes Economies as Much as Monopoly Does



Author's Note: Some 30 years ago, as an undergraduate studying Economics, I took a course in Industrial Organization and Public Policy. I have been mulling some of the ideas I first encountered in that course ever since. The following in the product of just such mulling.


Many Americans are at least passing familiar with the 19th-century rise of corporate monopoly power in this country to set prices when selling and the subsequent development of the anti-trust regulations and legislation that came about to limit the power of monopolies. Far fewer Americans, however, know about the flip side of monopoly: monopsony. Put bluntly, a monopolist controls the prices of goods and services it sells. By contrast, a monopsonist controls the prices of goods and services it buys.

Just as it is in the interest of a well-run capitalist economy to prevent the formation of monopolies, so too it should be the policy of those same economies to prevent the creation of monopsonies. Too much power to set prices when purchasing goods and services will produce the same destabilizing influence as too much power to set prices when selling those same goods and services.

WalMart may be starting to take on the least attractive qualities of both monopolist AND monopsonist. As the sole brick and mortar retailer for consumer staples in many communities across the country and increasingly the globe, WalMart’s ability to set prices is so common sense as to hardly require mentioning. But in many of those same communities, WalMart functions as a monopsonist purchaser . . . of labor. In many communities, WalMart is the only employer of note. Workers either work at WalMart or they don’t work.

If one thinks of a labor union as a voluntary monopoly on labor, meaning the union exerts solitary pricing power for labor for all its members in the various economic contexts in which it operates, it seems clear why labor unions would be desirable from a public policy perspective. Unions’ monopoly power as a seller of labor balances the might of WalMart and other giant monopsonist buyers of labor. I have left for another discussion consideration of WalMart’s monopsonist power as a buyer of products. Much anecdotal testimony exists as to how WalMart can threaten the existence of suppliers who fail to satisfy its pricing targets. Again, this anecdotal testimony suggests, if it does not prove definitively, that monopsonist power, whether to purchase labor or products, destabilizes markets. Policy makers should act strongly to curtail monopsony power. Failing that, policy makers should augment unions’ powers to organize and bargain collectively, if only to provide a necessary stabilizing balance to monopsony power.

Sunday, November 17, 2013

How high can it go?

I've recently been hearing a lot of discussion about an impending market correction or even crash. The prophets of doom have the numbers on their side: the S&P 500 has advanced some 25% so far in 2013, but corporate earnings have advanced only 3%. Simple logic tells us that this means the market is pushing the price-earnings ratio higher.

At some point, we will face 'reversion to the mean,' as historically, P-E ratios have averaged 14-15% and are now, depending on the metric one uses, in the neighborhood of 19-24%, i.e., far above their historical mean.

And yet . . .

The collective consciousness of the market could be right in pushing vauations so much higher in the absence of YTD growth. For one thing, if GDP growth begins to accelerate more quickly as we head into 2014, corporate earnings should grow to echo that GDP growth. Thus, what may now seem like historically high P-E ratios may soon appear closer to historical norms if the 'E' in the ratio increases. The collective consciousness of the markets tends to price in where it thinks the markets will be in 6-12 months.

So the market is pricing in continued growth (and acceleration in growth) of earnings.

But if the market is wrong . . .

A reversion to the mean could spell a very sharp correction in the near-term. It has been over 570 days since the markets have experienced a 10% correction but history tells us to expect one every 350 days or so. Again, 'reversion to the mean' comes to mind. If earnings do not grow as fast as anticipated or even decline, then the 'P' in the P-E ratio will decline to bring said ratio into conformity with historical norms.

As for myself, I have begun to trim back equity positions in large- and small-cap growth and have rotated some of those funds into value components and into bonds. Right now, I have about 48% in equities and about 52% in bonds and cash. If the market continues to ascend, I'll continue to trim equities into the rally and add to fixed-income and cash positions. As far as rotating back into equities, I'm now waiting for at least a 5% correction to take any decisive actions as far as augmenting my equity positions.